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Tim K Mackey1,2,3* and Bryan A Liang1,2Abstract
Background: Perhaps no greater challenge exists for public health, patient safety, and shared global health security,
than fake/falsified/fraudulent, poor quality unregulated drugs, also commonly known as “counterfeit medicines”,
now endemic in the global drug supply chain. Counterfeit medicines are prevalent everywhere, from traditional
healthcare settings to unregulated sectors, including the Internet. These dangerous medicines are expanding in
both therapeutic and geographic scope, threatening patient lives, leading to antimicrobial resistance, and profiting
criminal actors.
Discussion: Despite clear global public health threats, surveillance for counterfeit medicines remains extremely
limited, with available data pointing to an increasing global criminal trade that has yet to be addressed
appropriately. Efforts by a variety of public and private sector entities, national governments, and international
organizations have made inroads in combating this illicit trade, but are stymied by ineffectual governance and
divergent interests. Specifically, recent efforts by the World Health Organization, the primary international public
health agency, have failed to adequately incorporate the broad array of stakeholders necessary to combat the
problem. This has left the task of combating counterfeit medicines to other organizations such as UN Office of
Drugs and Crime and Interpol in order to fill this policy gap.
Summary: To address the current failure of the international community to mobilize against the worldwide
counterfeit medicines threat, we recommend the establishment of an enhanced global health governance trilateral
mechanism between WHO, UNODC, and Interpol to leverage the respective strengths and resources of these
organizations. This would allow these critical organizations, already engaged in the fight against counterfeit
medicines, to focus on and coordinate their respective domains of transnational crime prevention, public health,
and law enforcement field operations. Specifically, by forming a global partnership that focuses on combating the
transnational criminal and patient safety elements of this pre-eminent global health problem, there can be progress
against counterfeit drugs and their purveyors.
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A global debate has emerged about the appropriate
means to address the illicit trade in what have tradi-
tionally been known as ‘counterfeit medicines.’ Ideologi-
cal and economically motivated arguments over public
health concerns, intellectual property rights (IPRs), and
equitable access to medicines have resulted in a plethora
of related but varying terms attempting to define this
problem, including: ‘spurious,’ ‘substandard,’ ‘falsified,’
‘falsely-labeled,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘unregistered,’ ‘counterfeit,’
‘fake’ and the collective term ‘substandard/spurious/
falsely-labeled/falsified counterfeit medical products’
(SSFFC) [1]. The variety of terms utilized illustrates the
numerous, complex, and fractious intersecting political,
ideological, and policy issues embedded within the term
‘counterfeit medicines’ [1,2], yet ongoing arguments over
terminology have distracted attention from the actual
global health crisis, namely, the continued widespread
availability of counterfeit medicines in a variety of set-
tings that are dangerous to public health. At present, no
inclusive global health governance structure exists to
mobilize health diplomacy and the multitude of stake-
holder resources to combat this serious form of trans-
national pharmaceutical crime that affects population
health [3]. This despite the fact that as early as 1988, the
World Health Assembly (WHA) of the World Health
Organization (WHO) had called for international action
against counterfeit medicines in the interest of global
medicine safety [3].
However, with ongoing breaches in the global drug
supply chain and increasing detection, it appears that
key global policymakers have begun to recognize the sig-
nificant public health risks associated with counterfeit
medicines [4]. This includes renewed activities by UN
specialized agencies and other international organiza-
tions, as well as patient safety groups, law enforcement,
civil society, and the private sector, among others [4-9].
Although momentum for international action against
this public health hazard is building, the existing and
emerging initiatives lack policy coherence, and have
failed to coalesce around a unified purpose to protect
patient safety and bring about the necessary inter-
national co-operation. As these problem, policy, and pol-
itical streams join together, they provide the opportunity
for exploration of enhanced global health governance
structures to address this pre-eminent global health
concern [10].
Global scope of counterfeit medicines
Harm arises from a wide spectrum of detected dange-
rous counterfeit medicines across therapeutic classes,
with quality, manufacturing, and/or provenance issues
that make the product ineffective and/or harmful. In
this discussion, we focus on the subset of ‘dangerouscounterfeit medicines,’ which are intentionally substand-
ard, ineffective, or adulterated, as well as those instances
where there is criminal intent to deceive regarding the
authenticity or origin of the medicine. In the case of
dangerous counterfeit medicines, there is a clear public
health risk, given that these products can be harmful to
health, there is fraud or criminal intent involved, and/or
the authenticity/quality of the medicine cannot be as-
sured. This differs from instances where medicines are
unintentionally substandard and do not meet the legally
required quality specifications (such as, such as an error
in authorized manufacturing) [1]. In these unintentional
cases, legal principles of negligence can apply, and, if
reckless or egregious, possible criminal sanctions may
also apply. However, for illicit activities and intentional
fraud, a range of other remedial activities must also be
explored to determine an appropriate regulatory and
legal response.
Most importantly, dangerous counterfeit medicines
place all patients at risk, from developed to developing
countries, from formal and informal economy sectors,
from rural clinics to tertiary care centers, and from
resource-poor to high-income settings [2,11]. However,
global trafficking of counterfeit medicines is difficult to
quantify, largely because of the criminal element of the
trade and lack of adequate surveillance [2,3]. Previous
crude estimates indicated that 10% of global medicines
are counterfeit, although experts acknowledge the im-
precision, regional variation, and general paucity of data
behind this claim [12,13]. A report from the Orga-
nisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) also highlighted the difficulty in assessing coun-
terfeit medicines, owing to lack of data, divergent ter-
minology, and the standard tenet that covert illegal
activity is difficult to measure [14].
Available estimates have placed the global market for
counterfeit medicines at between US$75 and US$200
billion, indicating that this is a multibillion dollar illicit
enterprise, but also highlighting the wide range and gen-
eral lack of reliable information on the topic [12,15].
Similarly, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) estimated that the market for counterfeit
anti-malarial drugs was more than US$400 million in
west Africa alone, a region of the world where drug
regulatory systems have poor technical capacity and gov-
ernance [16,17]. OECD also noted expansion and in-
creasing diversity of medicines counterfeited, and an
increasing counterfeit presence in supply chains even
in strongly regulated countries [14]. Finally, WHO
itself estimated that the prevalence of counterfeit
medicines ranges from less than 1% in developed
countries, to 10 to 30% in developing markets, and up to
50% or more from websites that conceal their physical
location [11,18].
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ment in technology and the frenetic pace of globaliza-
tion, rendering international borders defenseless. Indeed,
a primary mechanism for counterfeit medicine distribu-
tion and sourcing is the Internet, which is rarely subject
to effective international oversight [19,20]. Instead, indi-
viduals from virtually any country with online access can
search for and potentially purchase pharmaceuticals, in-
cluding essential drugs, vaccines, controlled substances,
life-saving medicines for serious conditions, and lifestyle
products, all from the convenience of a computer or
even from a mobile device [2,14,19,21-26]. Addressing
online counterfeit distribution using multi-sector efforts
such as the enforcement action Operation Pangea I-VI
of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)
has resulted in millions of counterfeit pill seizures and
some 40,000 websites shut down, but appears to have
not stemmed the continued proliferation of illicit online
pharmacies [20,27].
Publicly available data collected by the Pharmaceutical
Security Institute (PSI), a not-for-profit organization of
pharmaceutical industry security directors collecting and
analyzing information on global pharmaceutical crime
(which, in addition to counterfeit incidents, includes il-
legal pharmaceutical diversion and theft), also shows in-
creasing criminal activity: an alarming 77% overall global
increase in incidents of pharmaceutical crime were veri-
fied from 2005 to 2011 (1,123 to 1,986 incidents) invol-
ving 532 different pharmaceutical products [28,29]. PSI
information is based on an incident-based reporting sys-
tem, verified in a similar fashion to information collected
by law enforcement agencies, and is sourced from PSI
pharmaceutical member and non-member companies,
law enforcement agencies, healthcare/regulatory agen-
cies, and open-source media reports. To be included, a
counterfeit product, using WHO definitions, must be
supported by factual information validated by a team of
multilingual criminal analysts from PSI [30].
However, these measurements are likely to be incom-
plete, and may underestimate the scope of the issue.
Even beyond the challenges in assessing criminal activity,
there is difficulty in assessment in regions such as
Africa, which suffer from low surveillance and reporting.
Further, trade in counterfeit medicines often affects
more than one country, making detection and accurate
reporting of origin, transit countries, and destination
difficult. In addition, measurement limits such as diffi-
culty in detection, reporting bias across regions, lack of
laboratory capacity to confirm that the product is
counterfeit, and lack of comprehensive data surveil-
lance sources, mean that conclusions from such data
are limited. These limitations emphasize the need for
better data collection, more robust monitoring and
surveillance, and a requirement for mandatory reportingat the individual country level to better inform researchers
and policymakers about the scope of this global health
problem.
Limitation of current public health efforts
Although the available data describing the problem of
global counterfeit medicines is less than robust, there is
broad international consensus that this criminal trade is
a serious global public health issue needing immediate
action [1,2,4]. Recent investigations and law enforcement
efforts have uncovered large-scale illegal counterfeit
manufacturing in emerging markets, ties to organized
crime and terrorism, and record global seizures in both
producing and consuming countries, all associated with
patient deaths worldwide [2,4,14,27].
Several key international organizations, including WHO,
UNODC, Interpol, and the World Customs Organization
(WCO), have attempted to address the global counter-
feit medicines issue. Most notably, beginning in 1988,
WHO has repeatedly issued resolutions and guidance,
while also attempting to be actively engaged in devel-
oping policies, programs and governance activities
(including its Good Governance for Medicines program)
in an attempt to ensure access to safe medicines and
combat against counterfeit drugs [3,31]. However, it
should be noted that WHO does not have enforcement
capabilities, cannot specifically address criminal or law
enforcement issues, and generally engages in technical
capacity building if resources are available. These limi-
tations hamper any attempted response to the criminal
element actively involved in the trade of dangerous
counterfeit medicines.
More recently, WHO has struggled to tackle this prob-
lem effectively, owing to divergent member state con-
cerns, incompatible ideologies between public health
and commercial IPRs, limitations of its current member
state-centric governance structures, and lack of adequate
resources including challenges from ongoing WHO re-
form [32,33]. These conflicts have severely hampered a
global response to the counterfeit medicines trade, and
have necessitated the entry of new international organi-
zations, such as UNODC and Interpol, because of
concern of WHO leadership and the need for active, fo-
cused, and effective engagement against the criminal
networks involved in this trade [34].
Specifically, the attempts by WHO to foster partner-
ships in combating this illicit trade and engage a broader
base of stakeholders has garnered harsh criticism. For
example, the WHO-chaired International Medical Pro-
ducts Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) brought
together a number of governments, international organi-
zations, civil society groups, private sector actors, law
enforcement agencies and others to combat this activity
in 2006 [35]. However, the future viability of IMPACT is
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ment of a new member state mechanism (MSM) in re-
sponse to criticism regarding perceived associations of
WHO with enforcement activities during its relationship
with IMPACT, primarily stemming from a customs sei-
zure in the Netherlands of generic pharmaceutical pro-
ducts en route from India to Brazil [3,36].
Importantly, MSM is a new governance structure
driven exclusively by member state participation, and
does not involve active inclusion of important non-
member state stakeholders that have been instrumental
and active in combating this criminal trade [37]. This re-
gression is symptomatic of larger contextual governance
problems within WHO. This includes the failure of
the WHA to adopt inclusive governance reforms (spe-
cifically, the World Health Forum proposal) to ensure
adequate funding and broader stakeholder participa-
tion [38]. This reflects the reality that WHO is sig-
nificantly limited in its ability to engage and leverage
resources of multiple stakeholders under its current
governance structures, lacks the necessary partner-
ships to provide crucial information for enforcement
operations, and has deficient resources to address the
issue programmatically.
Filling the gap: UNODC, Interpol, and other organizations
In response to WHO governance limitations, other
international organizations are filling the gap in institu-
tional capability that WHO is unable to provide. This
primarily involves UNODC, which specializes in estab-
lishing policy and coordinating actions in combating all
forms of transnational organized crime, including crime
prevention, criminal justice, corruption, terrorism, and
the trade and trafficking of illicit drugs worldwide [39].
All these elements have direct ties to the trade in dan-
gerous counterfeit drugs, and emerging engagement of
UNODC has already brought much-needed attention to
the fight against this form of transnational pharmaceut-
ical crime. Further, UNODC administers international
treaties that can be extended to criminal activities in-
volving dangerous counterfeit medicines, such as the
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(UNTOC), which has widespread international adoption,
applicability, and viable enforcement mechanisms [3].
Fortunately, UNODC is no stranger to engagement in
global health, as evidenced by its mandate to participate
in HIV/AIDS prevention through its ‘Think AIDS’ cam-
paign and other health activities [40,41]. In addition,
Resolution 20/6 by the UN Commission on Crime Pre-
vention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) specifically re-
quested and empowered UNODC to engage in the fight
against ‘fraudulent’ counterfeit medicines by conducting
research, providing technical assistance to member states,
and co-operation with other international organizations[5]. The CCPCJ resolution in conjunction with a recent
UNODC high-level conference of experts on fraudulent
medicines makes it clear that UNODC now has an im-
portant role to play in global governance responses to
dangerous counterfeit medicines [39].
UNODC has also partnered effectively with other
international organizations, such as Interpol, WCO, and
key actors in the public and private sectors, to lead ini-
tiatives that directly target pharmaceutical crime through
multi-sectoral law enforcement and border control
programs [42]. Importantly, UNODC resolutions have
historically supported and gained broad and inclusive
stakeholder engagement, extending beyond traditional
member state-only inclusion. Avoiding incompatible and
divergent member state domestic policy interests by fo-
cusing primarily on the transnational criminal aspects of
dangerous counterfeit medicines, UNODC represents a
more effective forum for stakeholder collaboration and
co-operation, but one that has yet to be fully leveraged.
In addition to UNODC activities, Interpol has had a
long-standing and effective role in facilitating training,
capacity building, investigations, enforcement, and pro-
secutions against dangerous counterfeit drug purveyors
both regionally and globally, and therefore should be
sought as an active partner in any response. Interpol has
the ability to mobilize law enforcement, customs and
border assets, and also engage with both the public and
private sectors (including scientific experts, financial in-
stitutions, laboratory facilities, and the pharmaceutical
industry) to develop intervention packages that support
on-the-ground operations aimed at directly disrupting
the trade in counterfeit medicines in both the regulated
and unregulated global drug supply chain [43,44]. In-
deed, Interpol has been the central actor in large global
seizures of dangerous drugs, and has recently initiated
the creation of the Interpol Pharmaceutical Crime Pro-
gramme as a comprehensive anti-pharmaceutical crime
initiative, in partnership with 29 of the world’s largest
pharmaceutical firms [45].
Hence, both UNODC and Interpol have demonstrated
an ability to engage effectively with other important
non-member state stakeholders on dangerous coun-
terfeit medicines, whereas WHO has experienced chal-
lenges. This more inclusive approach has resulted in
tangible results, including global co-operation in field
operations that have led to counterfeit drug seizures,
illicit website closures, arrests, and ongoing investiga-
tions [27]. However, despite this relative progression by
UNODC and Interpol on the issue, it is also clear that
operations and policy formulation need to be informed
by evidenced-based data and increased surveillance on
the public health and patient safety risks of dangerous
counterfeit medicines, which have traditionally been the
expertise of organizations such as WHO.
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Interpol trilateral co-operation mechanism
Currently, the official program activities of UNODC,
WHO, and Interpol operate in isolation or through ad
hoc partnerships that lack a formal and sustained gov-
ernance mechanism. As an example, neither UNODC
nor Interpol have observer status in the new WHO
MSM, despite the fact that both of these organizations
have institutional experience in cooperating with WHO
through initiatives like IMPACT and Interpol operations
in the past [34]. This lack of an active co-operation
mechanism is worrisome, and provides an indication
that WHO may no longer be seeking formal active en-
gagement with other international organizations and
actors outside of its MSM, at a time when broader en-
gagement is crucial.
In order to move forward, the respective technical
expertise, international legitimacy, financial and non-
financial resources, and leveraging of existing partner-
ship networks between these organizations must be
coordinated to create a cohesive and transparent gover-
nance framework. Given emerging strengths of UNODC
as a more inclusive governance forum for broaderFigure 1 Trilateral working group on counterfeit medicines.stakeholder mobilization and its UN mandate through
CCPCJ, a trilateral governance mechanism under the
auspices of UNODC, with the active participation of
WHO and Interpol, should be established [34]. We
propose the basic structure and primary roles of the or-
ganizations participating in this mechanism in Figure 1.
This could be accomplished by creating a permanent
intergovernmental trilateral working group (TWG) com-
posed of UNODC as the chair, and WHO and Interpol
as strategic partners. The purpose of the permanent
TWG would focus on enabling coordination and co-
operation specifically for combating the global trade
in dangerous counterfeit medicines, all within the re-
spective mandates and subject matter domains of each
organization. A similar governance structure was ex-
plored by the WHO working group of member states on
SSFFC in September 2011, but was dropped in favor of
the current WHO MSM [46].
Fortunately, partnerships within and between UN
specialized agencies and other international/intergo-
vernmental organizations are not particularly new. For
example, WHO, the World Intellectual Property Orga-
nization (WIPO), and the World Trade Organization
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mechanism on the issue of intellectual property and
public health, a topic with direct relevance to the global
debate on counterfeit medicines [47]. Multiple stake-
holder global environmental governance coordinated
through UN agencies, such as the United Nations Envir-
onmental Programme, have also been used to enhance
international co-operation, promote national develop-
ment planning, provide technical assistance, strengthen
laws and institutions, and engage in science-based
policy-making for transnational issues regarding the en-
vironment [48].
Enabling a pathway for the TWG could be the role of
the United Nations Office of Partnerships (UNOP).
UNOP serves as a gateway for partnership and alliance
opportunities within the UN, as well as engagement with
the private industry, foundations, and civil society on is-
sues supporting progress towards achieving the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) [49]. As the public
health threat of counterfeit medicines directly affects
population-based health and health-related MDGs as a
result of treatment failure, anti-microbial resistance, and
patient injury (leading to stunted economic development
and productivity), morbidity, and mortality, development
of partnership collaborations on dangerous counterfeit
medicines would fit into the goals of the programmatic
activities of UNOP, and consequentially should be
explored.
Specifically, a trilateral UNODC-WHO-Interpol struc-
ture would also allow the different organizations to more
effectively manage appropriate relationship with their
own interest-minded stakeholders, all within their re-
spective domains and internal governance requirements;
for example, WHO could manage public health, drug
regulatory authority and access to medicine stake-
holders; UNODC could interface with private sector
actors, customs agencies, and international crime and
justice groups; and Interpol could primarily engage
with law enforcement officials and engage in public
outreach/education campaigns.
Importantly, governance should be transparent, so that
the TWG can ensure the legitimacy and appropriate in-
clusion of necessary stakeholders in its actions. This
would allow for specialization of tasks at a high level,
and reduce the duplicative efforts that currently operate
in parallel under existing initiatives [3]. Further, each
organization could establish its own national single
points of contact within these subject-area domains. to
enable more effective communication and information
sharing from the TWG to relevant national authorities
for translation of data and global policy development.
Resources to fund activities of the TWG could be pro-
cured from a variety of sources subject to individual
organizational requirements. Hence, WHO could limitparticipation and funding on issues within its domain
that might prove controversial to its member states,
whereas UNODC and Interpol might more freely engage
in funding mechanisms from both member and non-
member states and entities. However, a minimum per-
centage of all collected funds should be earmarked to
support the general operations of the Trilateral WG in
order to ensure sustainability and maintain international
attention and co-operation against dangerous counterfeit
medicines, similar to other proposals for global health
governance and financing reform [38].
The TWG could also develop specific technical work-
ing groups to address unique and key risk factors in the
dangerous counterfeit medicines trade that require the
immediate attention and targeted expertise of select
participants (Table 1). These groups could include pro-
grammatic areas of: 1) global surveillance, pharmacovigi-
lance, and data collection (including development of a
central surveillance system, international tracking and
tracing systems/standards, and possible development of
m-pedigree solutions); 2) regulatory, legal and policy de-
velopment (to strengthen rule of law, enforcement, and
drug regulatory systems); 3) public outreach and educa-
tion (to inform consumers, patients, healthcare workers,
government agencies, and civil society, among others,
about the dangers of counterfeit medicine); and 4) infor-
mation technology and cybercrime (to address specific
risk factors such as the link between cybersecurity and
crime and illicit Internet-based sourcing). These tech-
nical working groups should also examine existing re-
gional or in-country models/tools aimed at combating
dangerous counterfeit medicines for potential regional
or global scalability.
The recent emergence of UNODC as an international
forum to lead criminal enforcement action against dan-
gerous counterfeit medicines provides an opportunity
for better balancing of global health governance through
the proposed TWG. Using UNODC as the lead inter-
national agency charged with the task of assessing and
coordinating stakeholder actions, coalescing specifically
around transnational criminal activity of the dangerous
counterfeit medicines trade, should also allow WHO the
freedom to operate as the expert technical agency it is
and redirect global efforts towards crime prevention and
patient safety protection.
Importantly, WHO can assess and recommend mea-
sures to promote public health issues arising from dan-
gerous counterfeit medicines, and contribute specialized
scientific and public health knowledge to this effort.
WHO could then concentrate on the core issues of
improving access to safe medicines, strengthening health
systems for better surveillance, developing monitoring
and evaluation protocols for sourcing/distributing safe
drugs, strengthening domestic drug regulatory and
Table 1 Proposed specific technical working groups with the trilateral working group




Specialized technical group to develop
a global, centralized, and harmonized
surveillance system for counterfeit
medicine detection, reporting, and data
sharing. Would also work to develop
process for global report on counterfeit
medicines
Pharmaceutical Security Institute
Counterfeit Incident System. WHO Pilot
SSFFC Global Surveillance and
Monitoring Project
Establish an active an internationally
agreed upon and scientifically validated
system for reporting and detection of
counterfeit medicines from various
sources, including drug regulatory
agencies, customs officials, public health
agencies, consumers and clinicians, and
law enforcement. Would allow for
development of data collection from
multiple stakeholders that would inform
evidence-based policy-making both
domestically and globally. Also possibly
develop globally harmonized tracking
and tracing system, development of e-
pedigree/m-pedigree technologies, or









counterfeit detection, engage in
regulatory capacity building and
strengthen pharmaceutical good
governance
UNTOC: Application of counterfeit
medicines trade as ‘serious crime’ under
UNTOC existing framework and
transnational enforcement tools, Council
of Europe MEDICRIME Convention: First
International Counterfeit Medicines
treaty, UN Environmental Programme
Basel Convention on transboundary
movement and management of
hazardous waste for pharmaceuticals
Aim to develop and implement public
policy, laws, and regulations at local,
national, regional, and potentially global
levels to combat the criminal trade in
dangerous counterfeit medicines. Also
aim to strengthen pharmaceutical
governance to address corruption in
health systems associated with drug
supply delivery. Should explore existing
regulations, laws, legislation, and treaty
instruments for possible expansion or
immediate application. This specifically
includes application of international
treaty instruments such as UNTOC,
MEDICRIME, and the Basel Convention
Public outreach and
education
Development of a unified and effective
public outreach and education
campaign tailored and aimed at a
diverse group of stakeholders including
consumers/patients, healthcare
professionals, law enforcement, drug
regulators, customs agents,
policymakers, civil society, and other
interested parties. Use of multimedia
channels and mediums to obtain
broadest coverage sensitive to target
audience
Interpol Counterfeit Medicines
Awareness Campaign 2010, US Food
and Drug Administration: BeSafeRx
Campaign, National Agency for Food,
Drug Administration and Control
(Nigeria) educational campaigns, Hong
Kong Consumer Council outreach and
awareness program on pharmacies
establishments detected as selling
counterfeit medicines
Fund initiatives to increase global
awareness among all interested parties
regarding the public health and patient
safety dangers of counterfeit medicines.
These efforts would attempt to address
the demand side of counterfeit
medicines from end users, increase
engagement on prevention from
healthcare professionals, and enable all
stakeholders to better report suspect




Special technical working group
composed of specialists in information
technology, cybersecurity, public health,
and law enforcement, with a mandate
to specifically address ties between
transnational cybercrime and illicit
online pharmacies
Interpol Pangea I-VI Multistakeholder
Operations.
Development of specific information
technology tools to detect and shut
down illicit online pharmacies and
affiliated third-party enabling
technologies. Exploration of existing
web monitoring technologies for
Internet content surveillance, utilization
of tools for technical blocking of
violating websites, suspension of
financial transactions/processing, and
use of other fraud detection tools.
Systems that enable verification and
certification of legitimate online
pharmacies with education of the
consumer should also be pursued
Public-private partnerships: US Alliance
for Safe Online Pharmacies; Center for
Safe Internet Pharmacies, Integration
with current global efforts of the
Internet Governance Forum to promote
online safety
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and studying the epidemiology of counterfeit drugs to en-
hance the efforts of UNODC and Interpol. Paramount to
this effort is the need for more accurate and reliable data
on the prevalence of dangerous counterfeit medicines, andsurveillance and laboratory capacity for identification. In-
deed, proper and robust data collection is fundamental
for justifying appropriate regulatory, legal, and law en-
forcement action. Efforts could include enhancement
of data collection under the WHO SSFFC Global
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reporting fields and collecting information from a variety
of sources (including drug regulatory, customs, and law
enforcement authorities) to form a centralized database.
This infrastructure would provide a better evidence base
for determining the true scope of the global counterfeit
medicines trade [50].
This trilateral proposal allows UNODC, in direct part-
nership with WHO and Interpol, to lead the effort on glo-
bal enforcement against dangerous counterfeit medicines,
independent of contentious IPR considerations, focusing
instead on established criminal activities [34]. WHO could
objectively identify incidents that present a global public
health danger, without consideration of IPRs, and share
these findings to this partnership for further assessment
based on scientifically validated data. Hence, involvement
of WHO would provide crucial public health information
to guide criminal enforcement efforts, capacity building,
and policy development on the issue, which is largely ab-
sent now. UNODC could then actively coordinate and en-
act policy to address pharmaceutical transnational crime
(including potential applicability of UNTOC), with Inter-
pol engaging in educational outreach and mobilizing glo-
bal law enforcement resources to actively disrupt criminal
networks [34]. Trade and IPR disputes would continue to
be heard by WTO and WIPO independently within their
respective dispute resolution forums. Drugs not fitting the
parameters of the dangerous counterfeit drugs group, but
that potentially violate IPRs, would be subject to WTO
and WIPO dispute resolution procedures and assessed
outside of the scope of the public health and criminal
activity considerations of the TWG. However, any such as-
sessment should also recognize public health priorities
expressed by other international treaties, specifically the
WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Doha Declaration [51]. These agreements
reaffirm rights of member states to exercise TRIPS flexibi-
lities in response to a national health emergency in en-
suring equitable access to medicines.
Such division of labor lends itself to better specialization
of UN agencies, leveraging their respective institutional
strengths and resources, and establishing better global
health governance to combat dangerous counterfeit medi-
cines. The union of these specialized UN agencies and
intergovernmental organizations under UNODC leader-
ship through the TWG would bring global coverage and
enhanced policy coherence to the issue. It would also pro-
vide greater legitimacy to actions, given that they are
multilateral in nature and not merely regional arrange-
ments. Most importantly, it would separate contentious
policy issues such as organized crime and public health
from IPR, and trade into appropriate international forums
that may act collaboratively towards shared social welfare,
equity, and justice goals.Conclusion
Recognition, coordination, and active engagement of key
stakeholders is essential in combating the global health
crisis of dangerous counterfeit medicines. UNODC rep-
resents the best forum to engage the multitude of frag-
mented actors currently addressing this issue. Hence,
enhanced global health governance and shared responsi-
bility through a UNODC-WHO-Interpol TWG mecha-
nism may provide a plausible way forward to promote
global health security, combat transnational pharmaceu-
tical crime, and, most importantly, ensure safe access to
medicines.
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